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The  long-run  behavior  of  economic  and  biological  processes  is  often  dramati- 
cally  altered  when  stochastic  influences  are  taken  into  account.  In  fact,  the 
smaller  the  noise,  the  more  drastic  the  change  can  be. This  seemingly  paradoxical 
point  is  illustrated  with  the  evolution  of  cooperation  in  repeated  Prisoner’s  Di- 
lemma.  Journal  of  Economic  Literature  Classification  Numbers:  026.  B  ~1  Aca- 
demic  Press.  Inc. 
The  emergence  of  cooperative  behavior  in  a  competitive  world  poses 
something  of  a puzzle  for  classical  theories  of  competition,  since  it  ap- 
pears  to  be inconsistent  with  the  pursuit  of  self-interest  by  individuals.  Of 
course,  cooperation  among  closely  related  individuals  makes  sense  if  it 
increases  the  fitness  of  a specific  gene  (Hamilton,  1964).  But  this  leaves 
open  the  question  of  why  cooperation  is often  observed  among  unrelated 
individuals  when  “cheating”  would  yield  a  higher  payoff  for  any  one  of 
them.  An  ingenious  game-theoretic  explanation  for  this  case  has been  put 
forward  by  Axelrod  and  Hamilton  (1981)  and  Axelrod  (1984).  Imagine  a 
large  population  of  individuals  who  engage  in pairwise  interactions.  Every 
time  that  two  individuals  meet,  they  play  a  “game”  whose  outcome  af- 
fects  the  number  of  offspring  that  each  of  them  leaves  in the  next  period. 
The  fittest  strategy  is the  one  with  the  highest  reproductive  success  rate. 
Even  though  a strategy  is temporarily  successful,  however,  it  may  even- 
tually  become  less fit  as the  frequency  of  the  other  strategies  in  the  popu- 
lation  changes.  In  particular,  a  necessary  condition  for  a  strategy’s  con- 
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tinued  success  is that  it  do  well  ~l~ainst  itself  in  addition  to  doing  well 
against  others.  Reciprocal  cooperation  has this  property,  whereas  purely 
noncooperative  behavior  does  not. 
Axelrod  and  Hamilton  demonstrated  this  point  in a celebrated  series  of 
experiments  on  the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  (PD)  game  that  will  be  described 
below  (Axelrod  and  Hamilton,  1981;  Axeh-od,  1984).  Their  results  have 
led  to  a good  deal  of  optimism  about  the  long-run  viability  of  cooperation 
in  a  competitive  environment.  We  shall  argue,  however,  that  the  sup- 
posed  advantage  of  tit-for-tat  does  not  necessarily  hold  when  their  model 
is made  more  realistic.  In  particular,  if the  payoff  rates  are assumed  to  be 
slightly  uuriuble,  then  tit-for-tat  is favored  in the  short  run  but  not  neces- 
sarily  in  the  long  run. 
Our  primary  purpose,  however,  is not  to  argue  for  or  against  the  viabil- 
ity  of  tit-for-tat  in the  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game.  Indeed  our  results  show 
that  the  verdict  is quite  sensitive  to  the  precise  way  in  which  the  model  is 
specified.  Rather,  our  goal  is to  call  attention  to  an  often-neglected  prop- 
erty  of  evolutionary  processes.  When  stochastic  effects  are  incorporated 
into  a dynamical  system,  not  only  can  it  alter  its  long-run  behavior,  but, 
paradoxically,  the  alteration  may  become  Iurger  as  the  noise  level  be- 
comes  smaller  (Freidlin  and  Wentzell,  1984;  Foster  and  Young,  1990). 
This  feature  of  stochastic  dynamical  systems  has  important  implications 
for  biological  and  economic  models  of  competition,  which  typically  de- 
scribe  the  macro-behavior  of  a  system  on  the  basis  of  many  interactions 
among  individuals.  The  usual  assumption  in these  models  is that  the  popu- 
lations  are  large;  hence,  whatever  variability  may  exist  in  the  outcome  of 
individual  interactions  tends  to  be smoothed  out  in the  aggregate.  It  there- 
fore  seems  reasonable  to  use  expectations,  since  the  stochastic  variation 
is  small.  Unfortunately,  this  simplification  can  give  quite  misleading 
results,  as we  shall  demonstrate.  We  choose  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  to  illus- 
trate  this  point  for  three  reasons.  First,  the  game  is quite  simple  and  is 
familiar  to  many  readers.  Second,  there  is a natural  source  of  noise  in the 
model,  namely,  the  number  of  rounds  of  play  in  which  each  pair  of  indi- 
viduals  engages.  Third,  the  stochastic  and  deterministic  versions  of  the 
evolutionary  model  lead  to  strikingly  different  results. 
THE  EVOLUTIONARY  MODEL  OF REPEATED PRISONER’S DILEMMA 
The  payoffs  from  the  one-shot  Prisoner’s  Dilemma  game  are  as follows: 
Cooperate  Defect 
Cooperate  Each  player  gets  3  Cooperator  gets  0 
Defector  gets  5 
Defect  Cooperator  gets  0 
Defector  gets  5  Each  player  gets  I COOPERATION IN  THESHORTAND  LONG RUN  147 
In  the  iterated  version  of  this  game  (abbreviated  IPD),  two  players  engage 
in  a series  of  one-shot  PD  games.  Both  players  know  that  the  engagement 
will  end  after  the  current  round  with  some  stated  probability  s called  the 
stopping  probability.  In  other  words,  the  first  round  occurs  for  sure,  the 
second  round  occurs  with  probability  I  -  s,  and  so forth.  The  expected 
number  of  rounds  per  engagement  is  I/s. 
Axelrod’s  evolutionary  experiment  was  conducted  in  the  following 
manner.  Contestants  were  invited  to  submit  strategies  for  playing  IPD. 
where  the  stopping  probability  was  stated  to  be  s =  .00346.  Several  hun- 
dred  strategies  were  entered  in  the  tournament.  Every  entry  was  paired 
against  every  other  entry  (including  itself)  for  five  engagements  of  IPD. 
The  lengths  of  the  five  engagements  were  63,77,  151,  156, and  308,  which 
was  the  result  of  a  single  random  draw  from  the  distribution  associated 
with  the  stopping  probability  .00346.  (The  results  of  this  draw  were  not 
known  to  the  contestants  of  course.)  This  tournament  produced  a  total 
score  for  each  strategy.  At  time  zero  the  “population”  consisted  of  the 
strategies  originally  entered  into  the  contest.  In  each  subsequent  period, 
the  relative  frequency  of  each  strategy  in  the  population  was  determined 
by  multiplying  its  frequency  in  the  previous  period  by  its  tournament 
score.  The  scores  therefore  played  the  role  of  reproductive  rates.  Note 
that  this  evolutionary  process  is completely  deterministic,  for  once  the 
initial  distribution  of  strategies  is specified,  then  so is the  distribution  in all 
subsequent  periods.  If  the  probabilistic  stopping  rule  were  adopted,  how- 
ever,  then  the  payoffs  in  each  period  would  be  a random  variable. 
To  illustrate  how  this  apparently  minor  modification  can  change  the 
long-run  behavior  of  the  system  in  a  major  way,  we  shall  consider  a 
tournament  with  just  three  strategies:  always  cooperate  (C),  always  de- 
fect  (D),  and  tit-for-tat  (T).  At  each  time  t,  let  n(t)  =  (nc( t),  nn( t),  nr(  t)) 
denote  the  number  of  C-,  D-,  and  T-players  in  the  population,  respec- 
tively,  and  let  N(t)  be  the  total  number  of  individuals.  Similarly,  let 
p(t)  = (pc(  t),  pD( t),  pT( t))  = n( t)lN(  t)  denote  the  proportions  of  C-,  D-, 
and  T-players  in  the  population. 
BEHAVIOROFTHE  DETERMINISTIC  SYSTEM WITH  EXPECTED VALUES 
For  the  moment,  let  us  ignore  the  stochastic  component  and  examine 
the  behavior  of  the  evolutionary  process  when  expected  values  are  used. 
Suppose  that  a D-player  meets  a T-player.  In  round  I  of  the  engagement, 
D’s  payoff  is 5  and  T’s  is 0.  Thereafter,  both  get  1 in  each  round.  The 
expected  number  of  rounds  after  the  first  is  1  /s  -  1. Therefore  D’s  ex- 
pected  payoff  is 5  +  (I/s  -  1) =  4  +  l/s.  In  this  manner  one  derives  the 
following  expected  payoff  matrix: 148  YOUNG  AND  FOSTER 
3/s  0 
A  =  5/s  I/s 
The  populations  evolve  over  time  according  to  the  discrete-time  dynami- 
cal  equation 
nj(t  +  1) =  n;(t)  A;n(t), 
where  i  =  C,  D,  T  and  A;  denotes  the  ith  row  of  A.  The  population 
proportions  evolve  according  to  the  equation 
Pi(f + 1) = Pi(f) Aip(t)l[p(t)Ap(f)l.  (1) 
The  state  space  of  this  dynamical  system  is diagrammed  in  Fig.  1 for  a 
stopping  probability  of  .20.  Each  point  in  the  triangle  represents  a set  of 
population  proportions.  For  example,  the  point  D  represents  a population 
consisting  entirely  of  defectors.  The  midpoint  of  the  line  DT  represents 
half  defectors,  half  T-players,  and  no  cooperators,  etc.  At  each  point,  the 
arrow  indicates  the  instantaneous  direction  in  which  the  proportions 
evolve.  Beginning  at  any  initial  point  such  as P, the  system  evolves  along 
a predictable,  evolutionary  path  (shown  here  as a dotted  line).  Any  point 
to  the  right  of  the  line  SS’ evolves  toward  T,  and  any  point  to  the  left  of 
the  line  evolves  toward  D.  If  the  T-players  have  enough  of  an  initial 
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foothold  relative  to  the  D-players,  then  the  former  will  be  evolutionarily 
favored,  otherwise  the  latter  will  be  favored. 
The  strategy  D  is locally  stable  in  the  sense that  any  path  beginning  in a 
sufficiently  small  neighborhood  of  D  converges  to  D.  This  notion  may  be 
interpreted  in  an  evolutionary  context  as follows.  Suppose  that  at  some 
point  in  time  the  system  consists  only  of  defectors.  Next,  suppose  that, 
by  immigration  or  mutation,  a small  number  of  newcomers  arrive  on  the 
scene  playing  C-  or  T-strategies.  Then  the  system  is  pushed  a  little  bit 
away  from  the  point  D.  Since  D  is locally  stable,  however,  the  forces  of 
selection  will  eventually  cause  the  system  to  revert  to  D.  In  the  language 
of  biology,  the  strategy  D  is evolutionarily  stable  (Maynard  Smith,  1982). 
At  first  glance,  it  would  appear  that  T  is also  evolutionarily  stable,  but 
this  is not  quite  true.  The  problem  is that  once  the  system  is pushed  away 
from  T,  then  the  process  will  evolve  back  in the  general  direction  ofT  but 
may  not  reach  it.  This  will  happen  if  the  D-players  die  out  before  the  C- 
players  do.  In  this  case,  the  evolutionary  path  ends  somewhere  near  T  on 
the  CT  line,  as  we  have  shown  in  Fig.  I.  Any  point  on  the  CT  line  is 
stationary,  because  C-players  and  T-players  are  equally  fit  when  there  are 
no  D-players  to  distinguish  between  them.  (The  fact  that  tit-for-tat  is not 
as  ESS was  originally  pointed  out  be  Selten  and  Hammerstein  (1984).) 
NONEXTINCTION 
It  might  be  objected  that  T  is  disqualified  from  being  evolutionarily 
stable  on  a  mere  technicality.  And  in  a  certain  sense  this  is  true.  The 
failure  of  T  to  be  evolutionarily  stable  depends  on  the  assumption  that 
strategies  can  become  permanently  extinct.  If  we  take  the  biological  met- 
aphor  seriously,  however,  then  this  is not  a very  natural  assumption  in the 
long  YUII. First,  most  populations  do  not  exist  in  isolation,  but  are  subject 
to  occasional  immigration  from  outside.  Second,  background  mutation  is 
constantly  at work  to  reinject  new  (and  previously  existing)  strategies  into 
the  system.  In  this  context,  extinction  is an  unlikely  event.  Moreover,  if 
mutation  can  reinstate  anything  that  existed  before,  then  permanent  ex- 
tinction  is  a  zero-probability  event.  It  seems  reasonable,  therefore,  to 
examine  the  behavior  of  such  systems  when  no  strategy  is allowed  to  die 
out  completely.  Specifically,  we  shall assume  that  mutation  injects  a small 
number  of  new  C-players,  T-players,  and  D-players  into  the  population  in 
each  period,  and  that  the  number  of  mutants  of  each  type  is proportional 
to  the  population  size  (i.e.,  the  rate  of  mutation  is constant).  Effectively, 
then,  the  evolutionary  process  stays  bounded  away  from  the  edges,  as 
shown  in  Fig.  2. In  this  case the  point  T*-which  represents  the  situation 
in  which  all  but  newcomers  are  playing  T-is  a bonajide  point  attractor 150  YOUNG  AND  FOSTER 
FIG.  2.  The  dynamical  system  with  a  small  background  mutation  rate  that  keeps  it  away 
from  the  boundary. 
toward  which  the  system  evolves  whenever  there  are  enough  T-players  to 
start  with. 
BEHAVIOROF  THE  STOCHASTIC  SYSTEM 
Let  us  recall  now  that  the  length  of  play  between  two  protagonists  is 
actually  a  random  variable  determined  by  the  stopping  probability.  For 
example,  the  payoff  to  a D-player  in  an engagement  with  a T-player  is 5 + 
X,  where  X is a geometric  random  variable  with  mean  (1 -  s)/s  and  stan- 
dard  deviation  m/s.  Note  that  the  longer  the  engagement  is,  the 
larger  the  payoff  to  D  (and  also  to  T).  While  this  convention  may  seem 
somewhat  unrealistic,  the  important  point  is  that  the  payoffs  between 
each  pair  of  players  are  variable,  which  is realistic. 
Suppose,  for  simplicity,  that  there  is a fixed  number  of  engagements  in 
each  time  period,  and  that  the  number  of  engagements  involving  each  pair 
of  strategies  is  proportional  to  their  frequencies  in  the  population.  As- 
sume  further  that  the  interactions  between  different  pairs  of  players  are 
independent.  Then  the  populations  evolve  according  to  a  stochastic  dy- 
namical  equation  of  the  form 
lZj(  t  +  I)  =  tZi(  t)  A$(  t))  +  VN( I),  (2) 
where  r is the  mutation  rate  and  A  is a random  matrix  whose  expectation 
is A.  Each  term  of  .& is the  mean  of  independent,  identically  distributed 
random  variables.  If  N(t)  is reasonably  large,  then  the  central  limit  theo- COOPERATION  IN  THE  SHORT  AND  LONG  RUN  151 
rem  implies  that  each  term  is  approximately  normally  distributed  with 
standard  deviation  proportional  to  IIN(  t). 
We  are  interested  in  the  behavior  of  the  system  when  the  population  is 
kept  fixed  at  some  level  N.  We  may  think  of  N  as the  equilibrium  size of 
the  population  relative  to  the  rest  of  the  environment  due  to  the  fact  that 
individuals  die  out  or  migrate. 
Consider  first  the  case  when  N  is  small.  Then  the  stochastic  term  is 
large,  and  the  process  bounces  erratically  around  the  state  space.  The 
basins  of  attraction  therefore  exert  little  influence,  because  the  noise 
overwhelms  the  underlying  selective  drift  in  the  system.  Consider  now 
the  opposite  case  in  which  the  population  is  large  and  the  stochastic 
variability  is small.  In  this  situation,  one  would  suppose  that  the  system  is 
likely  to  evolve  along  a path  that  is close  to  the  path  that  it  would  have 
taken  in  the  deterministic  case.  And  indeed  this  is the  case.  In  the  short 
run,  the  behavior  of  the  stochastic  process  is  likely  to  be  close  to  its 
behavior  in the  deterministic  situation.  There  is a complication  however. 
Once  the  process  reaches  a  boundary-say  the  point  T*-  it  does  not 
settle  down.  Small  fluctuations  continue  to  push  it  in  various  directions. 
Usually  it  returns  toward  T*,  but  occasionally  it  is  pushed  quite  far 
away-perhaps  all  the  way  into  the  D*-basin.  This  is  not  a  permanent 
disaster,  though,  because  chance  events  will  eventually  push  it  into  the 
T*-basin  again. 
How  often  is the  process  in  the  D*-basin  as compared  to  the  T*-basin? 
One  way  of  answering  this  question  is by  computer  simulation.  In  each 
period,  let  the  populations  evolve  according  to  the  dynamical  equation 
(2),  but  cull out  excess  members  in proportion  to  their  frequencies  to  keep 
the  total  number  of  individuals  constant  at  level  N.  Assume  a  mutation 
rate  of  0.1%;  that  is, new  C-,  D-,  and  T-players  are added  in each  period  at 
the  rate  of  one  per  thousand  of  the  existing  population. 
Beginning  with  equal  numbers  of  C-,  D-,  and  T-players,  we  ran  the 
process  for  one  million  periods.  Every  10 periods  we  recorded  the  current 
population  frequencies.  Figure  3 plots  the  results  for  a population  of  100 
individuals,  where  each  dot  represents  one  observation  in  the  run,  and 
there  are  a total  of  100,000  observations.  The  simulation  shows  that  the 
chances  are  about  .59  that  the  population  consists  of  at  least  90%  T- 
players,  and  about  .I8  that  it  consists  of  at  least  90%  D-players.  (These 
percentages  cannot  be  estimated  easily  from  the  figure,  because  the 
59,000  points  in the  T  corner  are  mostly  overstruck.)  In  other  words,  tit- 
for-tat  is favored  in  the  sense  that,  59%  of  the  time,  almost  all  of  the 
population  is composed  of  T-players.  Note  also  that  the  process  is either 
near  D*  or  near  T*  with  high  probability.  Intermediate  regimes,  or  those 
involving  many  cooperators,  are  quite  improbable. 
But  as N  increases  (and  the  noise  decreases),  the  outcome  is reversed. 
When  N  is 300,  for  example,  the  probabilities  favor  D  instead  of  T  (see 152  YOUNG  ANDFOSTER 
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FIG.  3.  Limiting  distribution  for  P  =  100. 
Fig.  4).  In  this  case  the  probability  is 81%  that  most  of  the  population  is 
playing  D.  As N  increases  further,  the  probability  becomes  overwhelming 
that,  in  the  very  long  run,  almost  everyone  is a defector  (see  Fig.  5). 
THE  PROBLEM  OFDEGENERATION 
Perhaps  even  more  interesting  than  this  finding  is the  explanation  for  it. 
Consider  the  situation  when  the  process  is close  to  T*.  The  defectors  (and 
the  cooperators)  have  almost  all  died  out.  In  this  relatively  tranquil 
environment,  pure  cooperation  has  become  almost  as  fit  as  tit-for-tat, 
because  there  are  few  defectors  at  large  to  punish  the  naivete  of  the 
cooperators.  Moreover,  there  is a chance  that  the  C-players  will  actually 
do  better  than  the  T-players  for  a certain  length  of  time.  This  would  occur, 
for  example,  if  C-C  engagements  happened  to  be  longer  than  T-T  en- 
gagements.  Of  course,  it is improbable  that  this  bias  would  persist  for  very 
long,  or  that  it  would  be  large  enough  to  negate  the  occasional  C-D 
encounters.  Nevertheless  it  could  happen,  and  given  a  sufficiently  long 
time  horizon,  it  almost  certainly  will  happen, 
In  other  words,  there  is a small  but  positive  probability  that  the  process 
will  start  to  creep  along  the  line  between  C*  and  T*.  At  any  moment,  of 
course,  chance  events  might  favor  the  defectors,  at  which  point  the  coop- 
erators  would  be  quickly  weeded  out  and  the  process  would  circle  back  to 
T*.  There  is,  nevertheless,  a small  but  positive  probability  that  the  weed- COOPERATION  IN  THE  SHORT  AND  LONG  RUN  153 
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FIG.  4.  Limiting  distribution  for  N  =  300. 
ing  out  process  will  not  occur  until  it  is  “too  late,”  that  is,  until  the  C- 
players  have  become  dominant.  In  this  event,  once  the  defectors  reassert 
themselves,  the  process  will  move  rapidly  toward  the  D*-corner,  and  both 
the  C-players  and  the  T-players  will  be  almost  wiped  out. 
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FIG. 5.  Long-run  probability  that  the  population  consists  of  90%  T-players  (alternatively, 
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This  is  still  not  the  end  of  the  story,  however.  Eventually,  through 
chance  events,  the  process  will  climb  out  of  the  D*-basin  and  evolve  once 
again  toward  T*.  But  overcoming  the  resistance  between  D*  and  the 
separatrix  SS’ by  small  chance  nudges  is extremely  difficult  and  unlikely. 
Like  Sisyphus  condemned  to  roll  the  rock  uphill,  the  process  will  make  it 
partway  up,  only  to  lose  headway  and  roll  back  down  again.  (Unlike 
Sisyphus,  however,  there  is  a  positive  probability  that  the  process  will 
eventually  make  it  all  the  way  up.)  By  contrast,  the  T*-basin  is  very 
shallow  along  its lower  boundary.  This  follows  because  cooperate  and  tit- 
for-tat  are  almost  equally  fit  when  the  background  level  of  defectors  is 
very  low.  Thus  there  is very  little  uphill  resistance  in going  from  T”  to  the 
separatrix,  from  which  it  is all downhill  to  D*.  In  sum,  climbing  out  of  the 
D*-basin  in  a given  length  of  time  is much  more  difficult  (i.e.,  less likely) 
than  creeping  away  from  T*  on  a nearly  level  field. 
This  intuitive  argument  can  be  made  analytically  rigorous  using  the 
theory  of  stochastic  dynamical  systems  (Freidlin  and  Wentzell,  1984; Fos- 
ter  and  Young,  1990).  The  basic  idea  is  to  compute  the  path  of  least 
resistance  between  the  two  locally  stable  regimes  D”; and  T”.  If  mutations 
are  sufficiently  small,  then  the  path  of  least  resistance  from  T”  to  D”  runs 
toward  C*,  passes the  separatrix,  then  drops  down  toward  D*.  The  resis- 
tance  along  this  path  is lower  than  the  resistance  along  uny  path  from  D” 
to  T*.  From  this  it follows  that  the  expected  transition  time  from  D”: to  T:” 
becomes  arbitrarily  large  relative  to  the  expected  transition  time  from  T” 
to  D*  as the  noise  becomes  small.  Hence  the  process  will  be  found  in  a 
neighborhood  of  D  with  near  certainty  as the  population  becomes  large. 
THE  DEGENERATION  OF  NONCOOPERATIVE  BEHAVIOR 
Thus  far  we  have  focussed  on  the  possibility  that  tit-for-tat  might  not  be 
viable  in the  long  run  because  it is undermined  by  less fit  strategies.  But  of 
course  the  same  arguments  can  be  applied  to  noncooperative  behavior. 
Defect  will  not  be  viable  in  the  long  run  if  it  is undermined  by  strategies 
that  only  look  like  defect,  that  are  cooperators  in  defectors’  clothing. 
Consider,  for  example,  the  following  strategy  : defect  on  the  first  round 
and  continue  to  defect  until  the  opponent  cooperates;  thereafter  play  tit- 
for-tat.  This  will  be  called  disguised  tit-for-tat  (DT).  Suppose  that  the 
tournament  consists  initially  of  the  three  strategies  D,  T,  and  DT.  Then, 
from  any  initial  frequency  distribution,  the  process  will  evolve  toward  tit- 
for-tat,  assuming  a  small  positive  mutation  rate  and  a  small  amount  of 
noise.  Thus  defect  may  also  be  vulnerable  to  degeneration.  In  general, 
one  cannot  conclude  very  much  about  the  long-run  viability  of  any  one COOPERATION  IN  THE  SHORT  AND  LONG  RUN  15.5 
strategy  without  making  a detailed  study  of  the  potential  function  associ- 
ated  with  the  whole  system. 
OTHER  SOURCES  OF  VARIABILITY 
The  sole  source  of  variability  considered  so far  arises  from  the  random 
length  of  engagements  between  different  players.  Many  other  sources  of 
noise  could  also  be  considered.  One  possibility  is noisy  channels  of  com- 
munication.  For  example,  a player  might  misread  the  action  taken  by  his 
opponent  with  some  small  probability  (Axelrod,  1984,  p.  183;  Molander, 
1985;  Donninger,  1986).  More  generally,  one  could  simply  postulate  that 
the  payoffs  from  any  engagement  between  any  two  players  are  random 
variables  with  finite  variances  and  expectations  equal  to  the  correspond- 
ing  payoffs  in  the  matrix  A.  If  the  number  of  engagements  per  period  is 
large,  and  payoffs  from  different  engagements  are  statistically  indepen- 
dent,  then  (by  the  central  limit  theorem)  the  variability  in  the  population 
proportions  will  be  approximately  normally  distributed  and  the  overall 
noise  level  will  be  inversely  proportional  to  the  population. 
Yet  another  possibility  is to  assume,  not  that  every  player  meets  every 
other  in  a  given  period,  but  that  a  fixed  proportion  of  the  players  are 
drawn  at  random  to  play  in  each  period.  If  the  population  is  large,  then 
this  variability  is also  well-approximated  by  a normal  distribution,  and  the 
variance  is proportional  to  the  inverse  of  the  population.  The  above  argu- 
ments  depend  only  on  this  assumption. 
CONCLUSION 
We  close  by  noting  that  these  arguments  are  just  a  special  case  of  a 
well-known  problem  in  evolutionary  theory.  If  the  selection  pressure  be- 
tween  two  genes  is very  slight,  then  there  is a chance  that  the  less-fit  gene 
will  become  fixed  in  the  population  due  to  random  drift  (Crow,  1986).  In 
the  first  example  the  two  genes  are  cooperate  (the  less  fit)  and  tit-for-tat 
(the  more  fit).  Unless  there  are  a sufficient  number  of  defectors  at  large  to 
keep  up  selection  pressure  against  cooperators,  the  cooperators  may  re- 
place  the  T-players.  To  put  it  another  way,  if  the  environment  is  not 
sufficiently  competitive  for  a  period,  then  the  genetic  make  up  of  an 
initially  fit  population  may  degenerate.  It  will  then  be  decimated  once 
competitive  forces  reassert  themselves.  Substantial  variability-includ- 
ing  a high  background  rate  of  mutation  and  immigration-is  necessary  to 
prevent  such  an  outcome.  For  the  evolution  of  cooperation,  the  moral  is 
simply  this:  unless  cooperative  strategies  are  constantly  being  tested  by 156  YOUNG  AND  FOSTER 
noncooperative  ones,  cooperation  is viable  in  the  short  run,  but  not  nec- 
essarily  in  the  long  run. 
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